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The labor supply and benefit claiming incentives provided by the early retirement rules of the 
Social Security Old Age benefits program are of growing importance as the Normal Retirement 
Age (NRA) increases to 67, the labor force participation of Older Americans rises, and a variety 
of reforms to the Social Security system are considered. Any reform needs to take into account 
the effects and rationale of the Social Security Earnings Test and the Actuarial Adjustment 
Factor. We describe these incentives, and analyze benefit withholding patterns using data from 
the Master Beneficiary Files of the Social Security Administration, and present descriptive and 
exploratory evidence on the determinants of benefit withholding using data from the Health and 
Retirement Survey. We then investigate the importance of the Earnings Test limits for work and 
claiming behavior using a dynamic life-cycle model of labor supply, benefit claiming, and 
withholding. We use the latter framework to compare the consequences of a number of changes 
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1 Introduction
Social Security provides fairly complex incentives that affect the earnings, labor supply and
monthly benefit amounts of individuals who are eligible for Social Security Old Age (SSOA)
benefits. Most individuals are currently claiming benefits before the Normal Retirement Age (as
of November of 2007, 70.9% of men and 75.7% of women in the U.S. claimed Social Security ben-
efits before the NRA), and around 7% of them work and earn enough such that their benefits are
reduced due to the Social Security Earnings Test (SSET). The number of older Americans affected
by the SSET is likely to increase dramatically in the coming years. This is due to the scheduled
increases in the Normal Retirement Age (NRA).
Two of the most important incentives of the system are the SSET, which determines the max-
imum level of earnings that do not result in a benefit reduction for individuals who have claimed
retirement benefits before the NRA, and the Actuarial Reduction Factor (ARF), which determines
the reduction in benefits that individuals face if they claim benefits early. The ARF is adjusted after
the NRA for benefits withheld due to earnings above the SSET limit (see Gustman and Steinmeier
(1991), Myers (1993, p. 52), Gruber and Orszag (1999, 2000)) providing a greater incentives for
individuals to claim benefits early and for individuals who claimed benefits early and had some
benefits withheld–to work and earn above the SSET limit before the NRA (see Benı́tez-Silva and
Heiland (2007, 2008), Benı́tez-Silva, Dwyer, Heiland, and Sanderson (2008)).
While the amount of benefits withheld due to earnings in excess of the SSET limit is the crucial
variable in these rules, very little is known about individuals’ actual benefit withholding patterns
and the characteristics of those who experience it. In this paper we analyze benefit claiming and
withholding patterns using several data sources and techniques. We investigate the characteristics
of individuals who claim benefits early and continue to work or return to the labor force after a
leisure spell and earn above the SSET limit. We provide evidence regarding such effects from
analyzes of benefit withholding data and simulation of a dynamic life-cycle retirement model. A
better understanding of who is affected by the SSET will help to make better predictions regarding
benefit take-up, work behavior, and SSET revenues under the scheduled increases in the NRA, and
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other important reform scenarios currently considered in the debate of securing long-term solvency
of Social Security. Properly identifying those that are less likely to work after claiming benefits
will also provide a quantitative measure of the possible induced entry effect into the SSDI or SSI
program if the Early Retirement Age were to be increased.
The next section describes in some detail the incentives provided by Social Security between
the ERA and the NRA, and discuss their implications for claiming behavior, earnings, and bene-
fits withholding patterns using data from the Master Beneficiary Files of the Social Security Ad-
ministration. We also present descriptive and exploratory results on the determinants of benefit
withholding conditions using data from the Health and Retirement Survey. We then investigate the
importance of the Earnings Test limits for work and claiming behavior using a dynamic life-cycle
model of labor supply, benefit claiming, and withholding. We use the latter framework to compare
the consequences of a removal of the Earnings Test to a reduction of the tax rate and an increase in
the earnings limit, for the labor supply behavior and earnings of older Americans. The final section
concludes.
2 Social Security Incentives for Early Retirement
Individuals who claim benefits before the NRA but continue to work or reenter the labor force can
reduce the early retirement penalty by suspending benefit payments.1 The Actuarial Reduction
Factor (or early retirement reduction factor), in turn, will be increased proportionally to the number
of months without benefits, which will increase benefits permanently after the individual reaches
the NRA. Given a NRA of 66, which will be the prevailing one for the cohort born between 1943
and 1954, the Actuarial Reduction Factor is a number between 0.75 and 1 depending on when the
individual claims benefits, and how many months he or she earns above the Earnings Test after
1In this paper we are not considering spousal benefits and joint decision making in the household. The complexities
introduced by those considerations are out of the scope of this analysis. By ignoring spousal benefits we are not taking
into account the fact that approximately 5.96% of the individuals who receive some type of Old Age, Survivors, or
Disability Insurance (OASDI) benefits receive them as spouses of entitled retirees. This percentage comes from the
Public-Use Microdata File provided by the Social Security Administration and refers to a 1% random sample of all
beneficiaries as of December of 2001.
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claiming benefits. This adjustment of the ARF allows those who become beneficiaries before the
NRA to partially or completely reverse the financial consequences of their decision, averting being
locked-in at the reduced rate. In the sequel of this section the exact details of these incentives are
presented.
2.1 Benefit Calculation
Individuals aged 62 or older who had earned income that was subject to the Social Security payroll
tax for at least 10 years since 1951 are eligible for retirement benefits under the Old Age benefits
program. Earnings are subject to the tax up to an income maximum that is updated annually
according to increases in the average wage. To determine the monthly benefit amount (MBA),
the Social Security Administration calculates the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) of a worker as
a concave piece-wise linear function of the worker’s average earnings subject to Social Security
taxes taken over her 35 years of highest earnings. If the benefits are claimed at the NRA (66 for
those born between 1943 and 1954), the MBA equals the PIA. If an individual decides to begin
receiving benefits before the NRA and exits the labor force or stays below the earnings limit, her
MBA is reduced by up to 25%, assuming a NRA of 66. Under the current regulation of the OA
program, the monthly benefit amount received upon first claiming benefits depends on the age





0  75  0  05  112   Months not claimed in the period prior to 3 years before NRA 	
	 PIA
if claimed more than 3 years before NRA;
0  80  0  20  136   Months not claimed in 3 years before NRA 	
	 *PIA
if claimed within the 3 years before NRA 
where MBAt represents the monthly benefit amount before the NRA (see SSA-S 2005, p.18).
Assuming that the individual continues to receive benefits, her MBAt is permanently reduced. The
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Actuarial Reduction Factor (ARF) underlying this calculation is a permanent reduction of benefits
by 5/9 of 1 percent per month for each month in which benefits are received in the three years
immediately prior to the NRA. The reduction of benefits is 5/12 of 1 percent for every month
before that. Thus, the maximum actuarial reduction will reach 30 percent as the NRA increases to
67 over the next few years (see SSA-S 2005, p.18). The reductions in benefits for early claimers
are designed to be approximately actuarially fair for the average individual. During the post-NRA
period additional adjustments exist: Workers claiming benefits after the NRA earn the delayed
retirement credit (DRC). For those born in 1943 or later it is 2/3 of 1 percent for each month up to
age 70 which is considered actuarially fair. For those born before 1943 it ranges from 11/24 to 5/8
of 1 percent per month, depending on their birth year.
2.2 Actuarial Reduction Factor
One less-emphasized feature of the process of benefit reduction due to early retirement is the
possibility to reduce the penalty even after initiating the receipt of benefits. The specifics of this
adjustment to the Actuarial Reduction Factor are documented in the Social Security Handbook
(SSA-H, §724. Basic reduction formulas, §728. Adjustment of reduction factor at FRA) and in
the internal operating manual used by Social Security field employees when processing claims for
Social Security benefits (SSA-M, RS00615. Computation of Monthly Benefits Amounts) but may
not be well-understood by the retirees. To illustrate this feature of the system, suppose the NRA
is 66 years, and an individual claims benefits at age 62 and n months, where n  48, receives
checks for x months where

n  x  48 	 , and suspends receiving checks after that until she turns
66 (after which she retires for good). In this case she receives x checks of
(2)
MBAt  
   0  75  0  05  112  n 	 PIA if claimed more than 3 years before NRA;
0  80  0  20  136  n 	 PIA if claimed within the 3 years before NRA 
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After turning 66, her MBA will be permanently increased to
MBAt   0  75   0  20  136  n 	  0  20  136   36  n  x 	
	 0  05  PIA  (3)
It is important to note that the adjustment of the ARF is automatic and becomes effective only after
reaching the NRA.
2.3 Earnings Test
The Earnings Test limit defines the maximum amount of income from work that a beneficiary
who claims benefits before the NRA under OASI may earn while still receiving the “full” MBA.
Some sources of income do not count under the Earnings Test. For details see SSA-H §1812.
Notice that retirement contributions by the employer do not count towards the limit, but additional
contributions by the employee even if they are through a payroll deduction are counted. This
means that individuals earning above the limit cannot just increase their retirement savings to avoid
being subject to the limit. We thank Barbara Lingg and Christine Vance from the Social Security
Administration for clarifying this point, which is rarely discussed in any publication. Earnings
above the limit are taxed at a rate of 50 percent for beneficiaries between age 62 and the January
of the year in which they reach the NRA, and 33 percent from January of that year until the month
they reach the NRA (SSA-S 2005, p.19; SSA-S 2005, Table 2.A18). For the latter period, the
earnings limit is higher, $33,240, compared with $12,480 for the earlier period as of 2006 (as of
2008 the limits are $13,560 and $36,120). Starting in 2000, the Earnings Test was eliminated for
individuals over the NRA.
Individuals who continue or reenter employment after claiming Social Security benefits before
the NRA, and whose earning power or hours constraints are such that their income from work is
around or below the earnings limit, are mailed their full monthly check from Social Security and
are locked-in at the reduced benefit rate permanently. Those with earnings above the limit will not
receive checks from Social Security for some months and thereby adjust their ARF. Notice that
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a beneficiary may receive a partial monthly benefit at the end of the tax year if there are excess
earnings that do not completely offset the monthly benefit amount (see SSA-H, §1806). Individuals
have the option of informing Social Security to suspend the monthly benefit payment at any time if
they believe they will be making earnings high enough above the Earnings Test. However, during
the first year after claiming benefits, the Social Security Administration performs a monthly test to
determine whether the person should receive the monthly check. As a result an early claimer who
is not working or earns below the limit in the months after claiming (“grace year”) will receive all
monthly benefits even if earnings for that calendar year exceed the Earnings Test limit due to high
earnings before claiming.
Social Security claim specialists emphasized to us that during the first year after claiming they
do what is most advantageous to the claimer, the monthly or the yearly test, if they have enough
information. However, they failed to clarify what that means. Some of them said the number
of checks individuals receive is maximized, but we were unable to find documentation of such
practices. In any case, the internal operating instructions used by Social Security field employees
when processing claims for Social Security benefits state that the monthly Earnings Test only
applies for the calendar year when benefits are initiated unless the type of benefit changes (see
SSA-M, RS02501.030). After the first year, the test is typically yearly and it depends on the
expected earnings of the individual. Given the scarce documentation of the functioning of the
ARF, having earned above the earnings limit, and thus receiving fewer checks, may be a common
way for beneficiaries to learn about the possibility of undoing the early retirement penalty.
2.4 Hypothesis
The possibility of affecting the Actuarial Reduction Factor (ARF) provides an incentive to claim
benefits before the NRA even if the individual expects to continue to work (or to return to work)
since having claimed benefits provides a type of insurance. Consistent with this hypothesis,
Benı́tez-Silva and Heiland (2007) develop a dynamic model of retirement that accounts for health
and income shocks and show that when individuals have the option to affect the reduction factor
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after claiming early, the proportion of individuals who claim benefits at 62 increases significantly.
Benı́tez-Silva, Dwyer, Heiland, and Sanderson (2008) use a similar dynamic model of retirement
but also account for Social Security reform expectations, that is the perceived likelihood that future
benefits will be cut. With this additional source of uncertainty in the model, they are able to explain
the large proportion of Americans claiming benefits early.
In addition to the incentive to claim benefits earlier, the rules discussed above are also expected
to affect the decision to work. Given that the reduction factor is not adjusted instantaneously
for benefits that are withheld between benefit initiation and the NRA, it is only actuarially fair
for early claimers who have either all or none of their benefits withheld during that time. Some
individuals will drop out of the labor force soon after claiming or earn consistently below the
Earnings Test limit throughout after claiming. Consistent with these predictions, Benı́tez-Silva and
Heiland (2007) and Benı́tez-Silva and Heiland (2008) find that individuals who claimed benefits
are less likely to drop from the labor force than individuals who have not claimed benefits and
continue to work, and that this effect weakens as individuals approach their NRA.
Individuals are also expected to be more likely to work and to experience benefit withholding
due to the SSET if they have higher earnings power. Since benefits withheld due to the Earnings
Test increase the ARF only after reaching the NRA, the resulting benefit flow can be actuarially
unfair for early claimers, providing an incentive for individuals who have benefits withheld to
continue to work and earn above the SSET limit. This incentive is weaker for individuals with
below-average life expectancy (individuals who are less willing to trade off present for future ben-
efits). As a result, we expect that respondents with poorer overall health and those who experience
health limitations that affect their ability to work are less likely to have benefits withheld due to
earnings.
If individuals are unaware of the fact that benefits withheld due to earnings are not lost but lead
to a higher benefit rate after the NRA, then they may only respond to the taxation incentive of the
Earnings Test and be less likely to claim benefits early when they expect to continue to work and try
to remain below the SSET limit if they claimed early (see Benı́tez-Silva and Heiland (2008)). This
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would suggest that individuals with greater financial knowledge are expected to be more likely to
respond to the full incentives provided by the SSET and the ARF, thus more likely to claim before
the NRA and earn above the SSET limit.2 Consistent with this idea, Friedberg (1998 and 2000),
in studies on the effect of changes in the Earnings Test rule prior to 2000 on labor supply, finds
that up to 5% of individuals bunch just below the Earnings Test limit and appear to adjust with the
Earnings Test limit. On the other hand, a recent analysis of labor force exit behavior in a sample
of individuals from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) produced evidence that early claimers
who do not withdraw from the labor force around the time they claim are increasingly likely to stay
in the labor force (see Benı́tez-Silva and Heiland (2007, 2008)), consistent with the full incentives
provided by the SSET and the ARF.
3 Evidence from Social Security Benefit Withholding Data
The Social Security Administration provides information on beneficiaries based on the Master
Beneficiary Record (MBR), a database of all beneficiaries, as well as a 10% and a 1% random
sample of the MBR. To illustrate the incidence of adjustments to the Actuarial Reductions Factor,
some estimates of overall trends and distribution of benefit withholding based on the 1% sample
taken from the Annual Statistical Supplements of 2000 to 2007 (Table 6.B1) are presented in
Figure 1.
The aggregate evidence based on Social Security’s Master Beneficiary Record (MBR) il-
lustrates the importance of benefit adjustments among recent cohorts of retirees. Among the
1,224,100 individuals who turned 62, 63 or 64 and initiated early retirement benefits in 2006,
the most recent year available, 74,500 saw some or all of their monthly checks withheld due to the
Earnings Test in that year (first panel), and therefore had their actuarial reduction factor affected
by their labor supply decisions after claiming benefits. The majority of these individuals had half
or more of their benefits withheld suggesting that they earned significantly above the Earnings Test
2See Vroman (1985), Burtless and Moffitt (1985), Honig and Reimers (1989), Leonesio (1990), Reimers and Honig
(1993), Reimers and Honig (1996), Baker and Benjamin (1999), and Friedberg (2000).
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limit between age 62 and the NRA.
The second panel shows that women are less likely to see their benefits withheld than men.
In 2006, 6.9% of men who claimed benefits early saw at least some of their benefits withheld
by Social Security compared to 5.3% of women. This reflects both the lower labor supply and the
lower wages of the women in that age group compared to men and is consistent with our hypothesis
that individuals with greater earnings power are more likely to experience benefit withholding. The
data also show that the fraction of early claimers who experience benefit withholding has decreased
by more than 3 percentage points between 1999 and 2002 and has fluctuated between 6% and 7%
since then. As discussed in Benı́tez-Silva and Heiland (2007), the decline may reflect worsening
labor market conditions for older workers since 2000. As the job prospects deteriorated, fewer
early claimers found employment which resulted in fewer cases of earnings above the Earnings
Test limit.
The third panel illustrates the incidence of benefit withholding at ages 62, 63 and 64 for male
and female beneficiaries combined since 1999. Those claiming at age 63 almost twice as often
experienced some withholding of reduced retirement benefits compared to those who claim at 62.
While the incidence rate has fallen slightly among those who claim at 62 or 63, it has fluctuated
quite dramatically for those claiming at age 64. It fell from 25.3% in 1999 to 5.5% in 2002 but
then increased to 11.9% in 2005 and 10.6% as of 2006. This pattern is likely the result of two
developments. First, as discussed in Benı́tez-Silva and Heiland (2007), the initial decline is likely
to be the result of the sharp increase in the Earnings Test limit that occurred between 1999 and 2002
for those who work between the January of the year in which they turn 65 and their birthdays. This
limit increased from $15,500 in 1999 to $30,000 in 2002, suggesting that even in the absence
of any behavioral response to the change, the number of individuals affected by the limit would
decline considerably. Second, changing labor market opportunities may play a role in these trends
for those 62 to 64. Individuals who initiate early benefits when they are closer to the NRA may be
more attached to the labor force than those claiming as soon as they become eligible for reduced
benefits. In the environment with fewer employment opportunities in the years 2000-2002, those
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claiming later may have been increasingly likely to withdraw from the labor market compared to
the boom years of the late 1990s. Consistent with this, individuals who initiated benefits at age
64 experienced higher levels of withholding after 2002 when the opportunities in the labor market
improved.
4 Individual-Level Evidence on Benefit Withholding
In this section we examine individuals’ characteristics associated with benefit withholding using
longitudinal data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). We construct measures of whether
individuals may have benefits withheld based on individuals’ reports of benefit initiation, benefit
receipt, and earnings receipt after claiming. To test the hypotheses discussed above, we estimate
multivariate models of potential benefit withholding controlling for a large set of factors that are
expected to influence the likelihood that benefits are withheld due to earnings above the Social
Security Earnings Test Limit. The set of explanatory variables used is shown in Table . To construct
these covariates we assigned characteristics from the closest survey wave available to the month of
a person’s 62nd birthday.
As proxies of a person’s market earnings power we use measures of educational attainment,
cognitive ability and work-related health limitations. Together with marital status and subjective
life expectancy, poor health may also capture leisure preferences. The availability and type of
health insurance, pension wealth, and asset wealth are expected to play an important role in the
decisions of when to withdraw from the labor force. Hence we have constructed an indicator for
individuals without health insurance and for those with private health insurance. The individual’s
wealth during this part of the life cycle is measured by net total household wealth, and an indicator
for whether they have a private pension.
Using the restricted earnings data from the HRS we have constructed a person’s PIA, that is a
measure of the respondent’s expected Social Security wealth at the NRA based on their history of
earnings. The restricted earnings data provide the history of earnings for the 9,472 individuals, as
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of the first wave of interviews, that gave permission to link their files, from 1951 to 1991. Haider
and Solon (2000) find little evidence of non-randomness and lack of representativeness in this
subsample of individuals. The PIA that employs the individuals’ earnings’ histories to imputes
earnings up to the individuals’ 62nd birthday in order to calculate the retirement benefits as of that
age. For ease of comparisons we convert it to the level corresponding to age 65, the NRA for the
sample members, using the monthly actuarial adjustment factor and assuming that any earnings
collected after 62 do not replace the previous 35 highest earnings years.
We employ two strategies to infer benefit withholding: (i) earnings exceeding the Social Se-
curity Earnings Test limits in a given year and (ii) a decline in the monthly amount. Following
strategy (i) we construct three binary variables, “Earnings  Limit” at 62, 63, and 64, that are set
to 1 if a person’s current earnings after claiming exceed the annual limit at age 62, 63, or 64 (and
0 otherwise).3 The universe for these measures are individuals who claim before the NRA, and
report positive earnings for at least some period after claiming. Based on reported monthly social
security benefits over time (expressed in constant 1991 $s), we construct a binary indicator that
equals 1 if a decline in benefits before the NRA occurs (0 otherwise). Given that some degree
of measurement error is likely, we only count declines of more than 10%. The universe for this
measure are respondents with two valid monthly benefit reports prior to NRA.
As shown in Table 5, looking across these four measures, withholding conditions are met in 7%
to 13% of the cases, a range in line with the aggregate proportion of benefit withholding observed
in 1999 (see Section 2). Notice that our measures do not directly compare to the proportion experi-
encing withholding by age at benefit initiation in the bottom panel of Figure 1. Our measures based
on the earnings’ conditions suggest that withholding is more likely to take place at age 63 and 64
than at age 62. This may be because of individuals who claimed benefits early and withdrew from
the workforce around that time but subsequently returned to the labor market. This explanation
is plausible, especially given that our data span the years 1992-2000, a period when employment
prospects improved steadily for all demographics.
3The relevant annual limits in our samples are those from 1992 to 2000 (in current $s): 7,440, 7,680, 8,040, 8,160,
8,280, 8,640, 9,120, 9,600, and 10,080.
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Table 6 reports the marginal effects from probit models of benefit withholding. The results
suggest that men are more likely to experience benefit withholding than women. This is consis-
tent with the idea that on average, men have great attachment to the labor force, allocate more of
their time to the market, and earn higher wages, and is consistent with the aggregate evidence we
have presented. These factors imply higher annual earnings and hence a high probability of having
Social Security benefits withheld due to earnings above the limit. Similarly, we find some evi-
dence that conditions for withholding are more likely to be met among respondents with advanced
degrees and among the financially knowledgeable individual in the household (columns 2, 3, and
4).
Based on the earnings criteria, individuals with higher public pension wealth, PIA, are more
likely to experience benefit withholding. Again, the greater earnings power associated with these
characteristics may translate into earnings above the limit. The fact that the PIA is associated
with a lower chance of benefit decline (column 4) may be due to differences in withholdings after
claiming. Individuals with high PIA who initiate benefits early may be relatively more likely to
continue to work after claiming, resulting in the collection of initially lower benefits, and then
withdraw for good before the NRA.
The results also show that having a private pension tends to be associated with a lower likeli-
hood of withholding, potentially reflecting a post-claiming wealth effect on labor supply such that
respondents with greater private pensions who work have shorter post-retirement working spells
and pursue employment in non-career jobs that are lower-paying. Finally, having greater perceived
longevity appears unrelated to benefit withholding, individuals with a health limitation for work
are less likely to meet our benefit withholding criteria, which suggests that even among those who
claim and continue to work, those in worse health have lower earnings power.
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5 Evidence from a Life-Cycle Model
5.1 The usefulness of the Life-Cycle Approach for Policy Evaluation
Before going into the details of the dynamic model we use to analyze the effects of policy reform to
the Earnings Test provisions of the Social Security system, it is worth discussing why it is necessary
to resort to the complexities of a full dynamic structural model to disentangle the effects at play.
First, it is clear that the individuals who would be facing these new incentives are making inter-
temporal decisions under uncertainty, and are taking into account the existence and details of all
social insurance programs for which they might be eligible.4 Second, given that the policy is new
and has not been implemented on this population before, no other methodology is better equipped
to assess the effects of this reform. Dynamic structural models provide a quasi-experimental setting
in which we can keep constant the rest of the environment in order to isolate the effect of changes
in incentives. However, this methodology comes with a cost; namely, that we need to make a
host of assumptions in order to solve and simulate these kinds of models, where some of these
assumptions are hard to justify except for tractability, and the need to set up the model with the
objective of matching the data.
The best way to understand these models is to think about their different pieces, and how they
come together to provide the policy recommendations that can help policy makers and lawmakers
when making their decisions. Economic models can be described as having three connected pieces
used to reflect the reality as close as possible. The first piece corresponds to the particular pa-
rameterization of preferences we will assume individuals have over consumption, leisure, health,
or other variables considered to belong in the utility functions of individuals. Preferences also
include a discount factor or a discount function that assesses the weight that future utility has with
respect to current utility. Preference characterizations are ad-hoc, and the particular parameteriza-
tions hard to defend beyond their tractability and their mathematical properties that can sometimes
be linked to certain behaviors which we believe reflect reality. In principle preferences could be
4See Benı́tez-Silva, Demiralp, and Liu (2008) for a recent discussion of what people know about Social Security
rules in the United States using survey data, and the cost of their lack of knowledge of the details of the system.
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easily changed to match just about any observable behavior, leading to the debate over the lack of
non-parametric identification of dynamic models (see Rust (1994), Taber (2000), and Magnac and
Thesmar (2002)). This lack of identification is not very satisfying, which leads most researchers to
use very similar characterizations of preferences using functions, the properties of which are well
understood and studied, and then providing in some cases a study of how sensitive their results are
to the particular preference assumptions. Researchers then claim identification of the model within
the parametric family chosen, and hope to find the best model within the constraints of the chosen
parametric model.
The second key element are the beliefs agents have about the future states of the world, and
about how current states will evolve towards those states. Many models assume perfect foresight,
such that uncertainty does not play any role, but the trend is towards allowing different sources
of uncertainty in dynamic models, using empirical distributions and stochastic processes to reflect
the likely beliefs of individuals over future states of the world. While researchers also have con-
siderable freedom in how they set up this part of the model, in general empirical data constrain
how they are characterized, and it is easier to check whether the characterization is appropriate for
the problem at hand. Modeling health uncertainties, wage uncertainties, interest rate uncertain-
ties, mortality uncertainties, unemployment uncertainties, uncertainties over future government
policies, and so on, are becoming commonplace among researchers dealing with these types of
models.
The third and final component, are the incentive structures set up to reflect the actual constraints
faced by real decision makers. Theoretically this is simple: just take into account the constraints
we know individuals face, and the laws specified in each case about the issue of study and include
them in the model. However, in reality this can be quite complex since it requires keeping track
of the large amount of information used by public and private entities to compute present and
future benefits or future and present entitlements of all kinds. These complex incentive structures
result in complications of the models and the need for simplifications in order to avoid the curse
of dimensionality which results in the lack of tractability of many models that conceptually are
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simple but become too large very quickly.
The key of using dynamic models for the analysis of policy reforms is to isolate the effects
of the changes to the incentive structure that individuals face, keeping their preference and beliefs
constant. This provides useful and reliable results, assuming that the benchmark models provide
a good characterization of reality. The results should in general be robust to different character-
izations of preferences and beliefs, assuming those are such that they come close to replicating
reality. Ideally, the benchmark models will be estimated and pass a rigorous test of the quality of
their approximation to reality, but in many cases they are either too complex to estimate or data
limitations prevents us from devising a full-fleshed estimation of the model, at least in the time
frames required to provide timely policy recommendations.
We believe that economists should first put most of their efforts in characterizing as closely as
possible to reality the incentive structure. After all, our social science is one of incentives, and it is
the only piece connected with policy, since preferences are in general considered to be very hard
(if at all possible) to change, and beliefs very slow to evolve and equally hard to modify through
economic policy. While it is especially tempting (and many fall into that temptation rather easily)
to use preference heterogeneity to explain behavior, it is less desirable than being able to account
for it through the appropriate incentives, or even empirically grounded homogeneous beliefs about
future events affecting economic constraints.
5.2 A Dynamic Model of Retirement
The model used in this paper is closely related to those presented in Rust and Phelan (1997),
and Benı́tez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2003 and 2006). Rust and Phelan (1997) did not model
consumption and savings decisions, but did estimate the parameters of the model, using a Nested
Fixed-Point algorithm, instead of calibrating them. Benı́tez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2003 and
2006) present the most closely related models, which are calibrated to match aggregate data and
household level data from the Health and Retirement Study, and model the Social Security Dis-
ability Insurance decisions on top of the OASI incentives. Unlike the structural model developed
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in the present paper, these earlier models (or any other structural models we are aware of) do not
explicitly accounted for the possibility of affecting the Actuarial Reduction, or the possibility of
expecting a possible benefit cut in the future. Our model also shares a number of characteristics
with the work of French (2005), van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2005), and Blau (2008) among other
researchers who solve, simulate, and in some cases estimate, dynamic retirement models under
uncertainty.
We assume that individuals live a maximum of 100 years, and face mortality probabilities sim-
ilar to those in the population. They start their working lives at age 21, and maximize the expected
discounted stream of future utility, where the per period utility function u

c  l  h  t 	 depends on
consumption c, leisure l, health status h, and age t. We specify a utility function for which more
consumption is better than less, with agents expressing a moderate level of risk aversion. The flip
side of utility of leisure is the disutility of work. We assume that the utility (disutility of work) is an
increasing function of age, is higher for individuals who are in worse health than individuals who
are in good health, and is lower for individuals with higher human capital measured by the average
wage. In addition, we assume that the worse an individual’s health is, the lower their overall level
of utility is, holding everything else constant. Moreover, we assume that individuals obtain utility
from bequeathing wealth to heirs after they die. This model assumes that individuals are forward
looking, and discount future periods at a constant rate β, assumed here to be equal to 0.96.
The model also allows for a variety of sources of uncertainty, like lifetime uncertainty, health
uncertainty, wage uncertainty, and more importantly, Social Security benefits level uncertainty. We
will see in the next section that the latter is essential to match the large peak of benefits claiming
at age 62. Notice, however, that within the model, this uncertainty is never realized, and benefits
are never cut, but the existence of a small probability of the event happening affects behavior, and
results in claiming benefits earlier, consistently with the empirical evidence.
Any person who is not already receiving Social Security Old Age benefits is eligible to apply
for OASI benefits.5 Individuals with at least 40 quarters of earnings covered for OASI before
5We are abstracting from Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), a program that allows workers with se-
vere disabilities to receive Social Security benefits before the NRA. This program currently covers about 7 million
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reaching their 62nd birthday are eligible to apply and benefit award is guaranteed. In the present
version of the model we allow decisions to be made on an annual basis and assume no lag between
application date and date of first receipt.
Calculation of benefits and the reduction factors are as explained in the Appendix on incentives
for early retirement, assuming a NRA of 66. In particular the number of checks received in a
year depends on the earnings after claiming: the number of checks (or the benefit amount on
some checks received towards the end of the period) are reduced reflecting the 50% rate on labor
incomes exceeding the Earnings Test limit between 62 and the January of the year a person turns
65 (33% thereafter). In other words, adjustments to benefits and ARFs occurs in accordance with
the earnings and the Earnings Test limit, and we do not consider the possibility that beneficiaries
ask Social Security for a reduction of benefits or return benefits received. Even though we set up
an annual decision-making process, the Social Security Earnings Test is enforced semiannually,
i.e. the benefits received by a beneficiary are adjusted, after reaching the NRA, for the earnings in
excess of the Earnings Test limit, as long as six months or more, of benefits were withheld in the
years between the early and Normal Retirement Ages. The structure and the details of the model
are described below.
5.3 Model Details
We solve the dynamic life-cycle model by backward induction, and by discretizing the space for
the continuous state variables.6 The terminal age is 100 and the age when individuals are assumed
to enter the labor force is 21. Prior to their 62nd birthday, agents in our model make a leisure
and consumption decision in each period. At 62 and until age 70, individuals decide on leisure,
consumption, and application for OASI benefits, denoted  lt  ct  ssdt  , at the beginning of each
period, where lt denotes leisure, ct denotes consumption, which is treated as a continuous decision
variable, and ssdt denotes the individual’s Social Security bene f it claiming decisions.
Americans. See Benı́tez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2003 and 2006) for a life-cycle model of retirement and SSDI
application.
6See Rust (1996), and Judd (1998) for a survey of numerical methods in economics.
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After age 70 is assumed that all individuals have claimed benefits, and again only consumption
and leisure choices are possible. Leisure time is normalized to 1, where lt   1 is defined as not
working at all, lt    543 corresponds to full time work, and lt    817 denotes part-time work.
These quantities correspond to the amount of waking time spent non-working, assuming that a
full-time job requires 2000 hours per year a part-time job requires 800 hours per year. We assume
two possible values for ssdt . If ssdt equals 1 the agent has initiated the receipt of benefits. If the
individual has not filed for benefits or is not eligible then ssdt is equal to 0.
If benefits are claimed before the NRA the monthly benefit amount is calculated similar to
equation (1) in the Appendix. For a NRA of 66 years the reduction factor if claimed at 62 is
75%, 80.0% if claimed at 63, 86.67% if claimed at 63, and 93.33% if claimed at 65. Due to the
Earnings Test, benefit initiation between the ERA and the NRA does not necessarily imply benefit
receipt, nor is the reduction in the benefit rate necessarily permanent after the NRA as a result
of the adjustment of the ARFs as discussed in the Appendix (see equation (2)). In particular, we
use an annual Earnings Test limit of $12,480 between 62 and 65 and $33,240 between 65 and 66
(these numbers reflect the 2006 limits). In the former period benefits are reduced at a rate of $1
per $2 of earnings above the limit and $1 per $3 of earnings above the limit for the latter period.
These are the correct rules for someone who turns 66 in December. Since those whose birthday is
earlier in the year face the higher limit and lower tax rate for less than a year (January to month of
birthday) we have also simulated two alternative versions, one with the $12,480 limit throughout,
and another using $20,760, the midpoint between the two limits and a tax rate of 50%. The results
of these models do not differ markedly from those presented in the paper and are available from
the authors upon request. Those claiming after 66 earn the delayed retirement credit. We model
it following the rates faced by the 1943-1954 cohorts, of 2/3 of 1% for each month not claimed
between age 66 and 70.
We also incorporate a detailed model of taxation of other income, including the progressive
federal income tax schedule (including the negative tax known as the EITC – Earned Income Tax
Credit), and state and local income, sales and property taxes. Individuals whose combined income
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(including Social Security benefits) exceeds a given threshold must pay Federal income taxes on
a portion of their Social Security benefits. We incorporate these rules in our model as well as the
15.75% Social Security payroll tax.
The model allows for three different sources of uncertainty: (a) lifetime uncertainty: modeled
to match the Life Tables of the United States with age and health specific survival probabilities;
(b) wage uncertainty: modeled to follow a log-normal distribution, function of average wages as
explained in more detail below; (c) health uncertainty: assumed to evolve in a Markovian fashion
using empirical transition probabilities from a variety of household surveys, including the NLSY79
and the HRS. The random draws to simulate these three sources of uncertainty are the same for all
the models compared in this paper, such that the differences presented in the results are only due
to the changes in the incentive schemes.
As explained in the previous section, we use reasonable parameter values based on aggregate
data and household surveys. The state of an individual at any point during the life cycle can
be summarized by five state variables: (i) Current age t; (ii) net (tangible) wealth wt ; (iii) the
individual’s Social Security benefit claiming state sst ; (iv) the individual’s health status, and (v) the
individual’s average wage, awt .7 For computational simplicity, we assume that decisions are made
annually rather than monthly, but we allow for the benefit adjustments due to earnings above the
Earnings Test limit to happen semi-annually. This means that although individuals can only decide
to claim benefits at the time they turn 62, 63, etc. their Social Security state can be updated every
year, depending in their labor earnings, to reflect that their benefits will be adjusted for benefits
withheld for periods of six months, or one year. Since the adjustment in benefits becomes effective
only after they reach the NRA individuals still receive benefits at the original claiming rate in the
period between the time of withholding of benefits until the NRA, consistent with current rules.
The sst variable can assume up to fourteen mutually exclusive values between 62 and 66:
7This translates into a problem with over half a million states in which to solve the model (80 periods, 15 discretized
wealth states, 8 discretized average wage states, 3 health states, and 18 Social Security states). We are able to solve
this model and simulate it 10,000 times in under 20 minutes in a Dual-Processor Linux Machine with 3.6GHz Xeon
Processors using Gauss, and exploiting its capability to link dynamic libraries written in C by the authors and some
of their co-authors. These C libraries perform over 95% of the computations involved in solving and simulating these
models. The code used for these simulations is available upon request, and will eventually be available on the web.
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sst   0 (not entitled to benefits), sst   62 (entitled to OASI benefits at the ERA), and sst  
62  5  63  63n  63  5  64  64n  65  5  66  66n represents the remaining 12 Social Security states cor-
responding to the level of benefits individuals will receive when they reach the NRA. For individ-
uals who decide to claim after the NRA, sst can take four additional values, age 67 to 70, since
everyone is assumed to claim no later than age 70. We created an additional (implicit state) vari-
able, ssnt , which can assume up to five mutually exclusive values: ssnt   0 (all benefits received,
i.e. no benefits withheld), ssnt   1 (representing an original claim at age 62 of someone who had
some benefits withheld; this applies, for example, to individuals with a sst equal to 62  5, 63n,
or 64n), ssnt   2 (representing an original claim at age 63 for someone who had some benefits
withheld), ssnt   3 (representing an original claim at age 64 for someone who had some benefits
withheld), etc. With this structure we are able to separate, for example, whether someone is a 63
claimer, denoted by sst   63, or is really a 62 claimer who has accumulated one year of withheld
benefits, represented here by sst   63n. These two individuals will receive the same amount of ben-
efits after the NRA, but their benefit would differ before the NRA, as explained in the Appendix,
and in additional detail in Benı́tez-Silva and Heiland (2006, and 2007).
In addition to age, wealth, health, Social Security status, Benefit Adjustment status, and current
income, the average indexed wage is a key variable in the dynamic model, serving two roles:
(1) it acts as a measure of permanent income that serves as a convenient sufficient statistic for
capturing serial correlation and predicting the evolution of annual wage earnings; and (2) it is key
to accurately model the rules governing payment of the Social Security benefits. An individual’s
highest 35 years of earnings are averaged and the resulting Average Indexed Earnings (AIE) is
denoted as awt . The PIA is the potential Social Security benefit rate for retiring at the NRA. It is a
piece-wise linear, concave function of awt , whose value is denoted by pia

awt 	 .
In principle, one needs to keep as state variables the entire past earnings history. To avoid this,
we follow Benı́tez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2006) and approximate the evolution of average
wages in a Markovian fashion, i.e., period t  1 average wage, awt  1, is predicted using only
age, t, current average wage, awt , and current period earnings, yt . Within a log-normal regression
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model, we follow Benı́tez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2003), such that:
log

awt  1 	   γ1  γ2 log  yt 	 γ3 log  awt 	 γ4t  γ5t2  εt  (4)
The R2 for this type of regression is very high, with an extremely small estimated standard error,
resulting from the low variability of the  awt  sequences. This is a key aspect of the model given
the important computational simplification that allows us to accurately model the Social Security
rules in our DP model with minimal number of state variables.
We then use the observed sequence of average wages as regressors to estimate the following
log-normal regression model of an individual’s annual earnings:
log

yt  1 	   α1  α2 log  awt 	 α3t  α4t2  ηt  (5)
This equation describes the evolution of earnings for full-time employment. Part-time workers
are assumed to earn a pro-rata share of the full-time earnings level (i.e., part-time earnings are
0  8  800  2000 of the full-time wage level given in equation (5)). The factor of 0  8 incorporates the
assumption that the rate of pay working part-time is 80% of the full-time rate. Using the history of
earnings from the restricted HRS data set we obtained very high R2 using this methodology.
The advantage of using awt instead of the actual Average Indexed Earnings is that awt becomes
a sufficient statistic for the person’s earnings history. Thus we need only keep track of awt , and
update it recursively using the latest earnings according to (4), rather than having to keep track
of the entire earnings history in order to determine the 35 highest earnings years, which the AIE
requires.
For the 1943-1954 cohort the NRA is 66 and the PIA is permanently reduced after the NRA by
an actuarial reduction factor of exp
  g1  k  ad jm 	
	 , where k is the number of years prior to the
NRA but after the ERA that the individual first starts receiving OASI benefits and ad jm corrects
for periods where no benefits were received due to earnings above the Earnings test limit. Before
the NRA, benefits are reduced by an actuarial reduction factor of exp
  g1k 	 . In the absence of
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adjustments to the ARFs, the actuarial reduction rate for the 1943 to 1954 cohort is g1    0713,
which results in a reduced benefit of 75% of the PIA for an individual who first starts receiving
OASI benefits at age 62 in the absence of any adjustments of the ARFs. In the policy simulations
that increase the NRA to 67, the reduced benefit at age 62 is 70% of the PIA.
To increase the incentives to delay retirement, the 1983 Social Security reforms gradually in-
creased the NRA from 65 to 67 and increased the delayed retirement credit. This is a permanent
increase in the PIA by a factor of exp  g2l  , where l denotes the number of years after the NRA
that the individual delays receiving OASI benefits. The rate g2 is being gradually increased over
time. The relevant value for the 1943 to 1954 cohort is g2   0  0769, which corresponds to an in-
crease in 8% in benefits per year of delay after the NRA. The maximum value of l is MRA  NRA,
where MRA denotes a “maximum retirement age” (currently 70), beyond which further delays in
retirement yield no further increases in PIA. Clearly, it is not optimal to delay applying for OASI
benefits beyond the MRA, because due to mortality, further delays generally reduce the present
value of OASI benefits the person will collect over their remaining lifetime.
We assume that the individual’s utility is given by
ut

c  l  h  age 	   cγ  1
γ
 φ  age  h  aw 	 log  l 	  2h  (6)
where h denotes the health status and φ

age  h  aw 	 is a weight that can be interpreted as the relative
disutility of work. We use the same specification for φ and the disutility from working as in Benı́tez-
Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2006). The disutility of work increases with age, and is uniformly
higher the worse one’s health is. If an individual is in good health, the disutility of work increases
much more gradually with age compared to the poor health, or disabled health, states. The disutility
of work decreases with average wage. We postulate that high wage workers, especially highly
educated professionals, have better working conditions than most lower wage blue collar workers,
whose jobs are more likely to involve less pleasant, more repetitive, working conditions and a
higher level of physical labor.
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We assume that there are no time or financial costs involved in applying for OASI benefits. The
parameter γ indexes the individual’s level of risk aversion. As γ ! 0 the utility of consumption
approaches log

c 	 . We use γ    37, which corresponds to a moderate degree of risk aversion,
i.e., implied behavior that is slightly more risk averse than that implied by logarithmic preferences.
Let Vt

w  aw  ss  h 	 denote the individual’s value function, the expected present discounted value
of utility from age t onward for an individual with current wealth w, average wage aw, in Social
Security state ss and health state h. We solved the DP problem via numerical computation of the
Bellman recursion for Vt given by
Vt

w  aw  ss  h 	   max
0 " c " w
l #%$& 54 '(& 81 ' 1 )
ssd # At * ss +
Vt

w  aw  ss  c  l  ssd  h 	, where (7)
Vt

w  aw  ss  c  l  ssd  h 	   ut  c  l  h 	 β  1  dt  h 	- EVt  1  w  aw  ss  c  l  ssd  h 	,
 dt  h 	 EB  w  aw  ss  c  l  ssd  h 	, (8)
where At

ss 	 denotes the set of feasible Social Security choices for a person of age t in Social
Security state ss and dt

h 	 denotes the age and health-specific mortality rate, B  w 	 is the bequest
function, and EB denotes its conditional expectation. We have used the HRS and AHEAD data
to estimate age and health-specific death rates, but since there is little data on individuals over
80 years old we make parametric smoothness assumptions on the dt

h 	 function (basically a logit
functional form that is polynomial in t and has dummy variables for the various health states h)
and subject the estimates to the further restriction that for each t the expected hazard over h should
equal the unconditional age-specific death rates given in the 1997 edition of the U.S. Decennial life
tables.8 The function EVt  1 denotes the conditional expectation of next period’s value function,
8De Nardi, French, and Jones (2006) find that more sophisticated mortality characterizations do not seem to sig-
nificantly improve the fit of a related dynamic structural model which focuses on post-retirement saving behavior.
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given the individual’s current state

w  aw  ss  h 	 and decision  c  l  ssd 	 . Specifically, we have
EVt  1  w  aw  ss  c  l  ssd  h 	   .
y / 2∑h /10 0
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∑
ss /(0 0Vt  1  wpt  w  aw  y 23 ss  ssd 	, awpt  aw  y 2	, ss 2	4 ft  y 265 aw 	 kt  h 275 h 	 gt  ss 275 aw  w  ss  ssd 	 dy 28 (9)
where awpt

aw  y 	 is the Markovian updating rule that approximates Social Security’s exact for-
mula for updating an individual’s average wage, and wpt summarizes the law of motion for next
period’s wealth, that is,
wpt

w  aw  y  ss  ssd 	   R 9 w  ssbt  aw  y 23 ss  ssd 	 y 2: τ  y 23 w 	; c <= (10)
where R is the return on saving, and τ

y  w 	 is the tax function, which includes income taxes such
as Federal income taxes and Social Security taxes and potentially other types of state/local income
and property/wealth taxes. The awpt function, derived from (4), is given by
awpt

aw  y 	   exp > γ1  γ2 log  y 	 γ3 log  aw 	 γ4t  γ5t2  σ2  2 ?@ (11)
where σ is the estimated standard error in the regression (4). Note there is a potential “Jensen’s
inequality” problem here due to the fact that we have substituted the conditional expectation of
wt  1 into the next period value function Vt  1 over wt  1 and awt  1 jointly. However, as noted
above, the R2 for the regression of awt  1 on awt is virtually 1 with an extremely small estimated
standard error σ̂. In this case there is virtually no error resulting from substituting what is an
essentially deterministic mapping determining awt  1 from wt  1 and awt .
Above, ft

y 5 aw 	 is a log-normal distribution of current earnings, given current age t and average
wealth aw, that is implied by (5) under the additional assumption of normality of errors ηt . The
discrete conditional probability distributions gt

ss 2 5 aw  w  ss  ssd 	 and kt  h 2 5 h 	 reflect the transition
probabilities in the Social Security and health states, respectively.
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6 Simulation Results and Policy Experiments
6.1 Three Period Model
To illustrate the main mechanisms and sources of uncertainty of the life cycle framework as they
relate to benefit claiming, we will start the discussion with results from a three-period version of the
model. Here, we think of the second period as the period of early retirement, roughly correspond-
ing to age 62. Individuals retire (draw benefits for sure) in the third (last) period, corresponding
to age 70. In the benchmark calibration of this model, we assume that benefits received in period
two are subject to an adjustment factor of 46.66%, i.e. the penalty for claiming benefits early is
53.34%. Abstracting from the Delayed Retirement Credit and the Earnings Test which cannot be
meaningfully represented in the three period version of the model, this penalty for early benefits
can be illustrated as the product of 96 months, the number of months between 62 and 70, and 5/9
of 1%, the current actuarial reduction for every month between the ERA and the year in which the
individual reaches the NRA.
The benchmark model with a reduction factor of 46.66%, a 20% mortality rate, and a discount
factor, β, of 0  96 predicts about equal fractions of early vs. late claiming. Based on 10,000 sim-
ulations, the percentage of individuals claiming early (period two) is 50.95%, with the remaining
49.05% of individuals drawing up benefits in period three. Raising the adjustment factor lowers the
penalty associated with claiming benefits early, causing a greater fraction of individuals to choose
to claim benefits early, all else equal. For example, increasing the adjustment factor from 46.66%
as in the benchmark model to 55%, results in 62.13% of individuals claiming benefits early.9
Life expectancy is an important source of uncertainty affecting the distribution of benefit claim-
ing: An increase in the period mortality risk from 20% (baseline) to 25% results in 58.2% of in-
9This exercise can also be understood in the context of the discussion of Queisser and Whitehouse (2006), who
using 2002 mortality data, find that the US reduction for early retirement is not actuarially fair (it is too low), and
too generous given current mortality figures, which results in a subsidy of early retirement and a penalization of late
retirement. The case of the lower penalty represents what (the now longer lived) individuals are actually facing, while
the benchmark shows what they should be facing if the system was actuarially fair in line with newer mortality data.
Our result clearly shows that the case with a lower penalty leads to more early claiming. This can in part explain the
preference for early retirement expressed by Americans in the last decades.
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dividuals claiming benefits early.10 Intuitively, a greater mortality risk induces a decline in the
expected level of satisfaction from future consumption and leisure (which is now less likely to
occur), causing a shift towards more consumption in earlier periods. As discussed above, health
uncertainty is linked to early claiming as a worse health condition makes working more difficult (it
increases the disutility from work). In the benchmark model we assume an initial health distribu-
tion and a subsequent deterioration of health according to empirically based health transition rates.
Ignoring health transitions leads to more individuals surviving and a more healthy population in
period two and three. The percentage of individuals claiming benefits early is reduced to 40.9%,
consistent with more labor supply and less reliance on (reduced) public pension benefits in period
two.
We also considered a number of other variations that help us understand the mechanisms at
play in this type of model. First, we changed the discount factor to model different degrees of
impatience among individuals. When lowering the discount factor from the benchmark level of
0.96 to 0.90, the share of individuals who claim early rises from 50.95% to 53.64%. We also
obtained predictions for claiming behavior in models assuming a 20% higher initial wealth level
and a 20% higher initial average wage, respectively, compared to the benchmark case. A greater
initial wealth is associated with more early claiming, from the 50.95% of the benchmark to 55%,
consistent with an increase in the demand for leisure (wealth effect), especially in periods two and
three. Similarly, a rise in the initial wage distribution induces a net increase in early claiming as
well due to the higher life time income; 53.15% of individuals claim in period two in this case.
While the net effect of an increase in initial wealth and average wage is rather similar on the
benefits claiming decision, the effect on labor supply is quite different. The higher initial wealth
leads to lower labor force participation in the three periods, and especially in period three. On
the other hand, the higher initial average wage leads to higher labor force participation in periods
one and three, and almost identical participation in period two. Furthermore, the percentage of
full-time workers goes up sharply in periods two and three. In the case of the shift in the initial
10The baseline mortality probabilities were chosen such that the number of individuals in the simulations who
survive to period two and three roughly matches the number of survivors to age 62 and 70 in the full model.
26
wage distribution, the induced (negative) wealth effect on leisure is offset for some individuals
by a substitution effect resulting from higher period wages. The latter effect is reinforced by the
characterization of the disutility of work which is sensitive to changes in the average wage as
discussed above.
6.2 Main Results
Tables 1 to 4 provide the information on the proportion of individuals claiming benefits at different
ages since 1994, as well as their benefits levels, using the aggregate information provided in the
Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin (for the period between 1994 and 2006), as
well as from the OASDI Public-Use Microdata File in its 2004 release. These two sources of data
are intimately related since they come from the same Master Beneficiary Record of all Americans
that contribute to the Social Security system, but they present information in a slightly different
way, complementing each other in very interesting ways.
In particular, the information we use from the Supplement is reported in Table 6.A4 of the
2007 edition, and in similar tables in the historical editions of the document. The table in question
reports the exact number of Americans claiming retirement benefits at each age in a given year,
and also the average benefit level for those claiming at a particular age in that particular year.
Notice that a given individual only appears in one of the cells identified by age and year, and that
corresponds to the first time they apply for benefits. We present this data in Tables 1 and 2 below.
The 2004 Benefits and Earnings Public-Use File is a one-percent random sample of OASDI
beneficiaries who were on the Social Security records in December 2004. It contains 473,366
records as of December 2004, and includes information in sixteen fields on OASDI beneficiaries’
characteristics, mainly about benefits entitlements. This more detailed information allows us to
focus only on retired workers who claimed on their own earnings history
Overall, the main difference between the two sources of data is that the Microdata, since it only
includes individuals who claim on their own earnings history, is a better comparison to our model.
As we will see below, this is good news for us, since the proportions of individuals claiming at the
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different ages matches very well with the predictions of our preferred model.11
Table reports results from two different models of Social Security, assuming a NRA of 66.12
Model 1 treats the Earnings Test as a pure tax on earnings above the corresponding ET limit, which
is how it may be perceived by a proportion of the general public given the difficulties in under-
standing the role of the adjustment factors when working beyond benefit take-up (Benı́tez-Silva
and Heiland, 2007 and 2008), and how a majority of researchers have modeled these incentives.
Using this framework, our model of optimal behavior predicts that only about 25% of claimers
would take up at age 62, with a larger peak at 65 at roughly 32%, with a bulk of the remaining
beneficiaries claiming at the ages in between. Benefits, given this behavior, increase slightly with
age at all points so that there are economic incentives for delaying take-up.
With the implementation of the proper Earnings Test incentives, which allow for the modi-
fication of the actuarial reduction factor through work after take-up with earnings above the ET
limit, Model 2 shows a trend towards earlier claiming of benefits. This moves us closer to the
actual take-up rates with a jump from only 25% claiming at 62 in Model 1 to over 48% in Model
2. The actual current take-up rate is around 53.8% if we use SSA’s Statistical Supplement, 2007,
but 49.6% as of 2004 if we use the more reliable Public-Use Microdata File, as explained above,
which only focuses on the retirement behavior of workers and does not include the dependents as
the Statistical Supplement. There continues to be a second peak at age 65, this time smaller, with
23.66% of the sample (in the Public-Use Microdata File is 20%), and around 4% waiting to age
66.
The results of Model 2 (which we label the benchmark model) also provide evidence that our
model does a good overall job in matching the resources that individuals have, since the benefits
levels predicted by the model are of the same order of magnitude as those in the data, eventhough
the model predicts higher benefits. Given that we are using a NRA of 66, and individuals also
11See Benı́tez-Silva and Yin (2008) for a detailed analyzes of these sources of data and how they can be used to
analyze the effects of recent changes to the Social Security System.
12In this paper we focus on claiming behavior and labor supply, but the model also simulates the evolution of
wealth, consumption, and wages over the life cycle. As shown in Benı́tez-Silva, Buchinksy, and Rust (2006), in a
related model, the predictions of the model are consistent with the HRS data.
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face the Earnings Test between age 65 and 66 as a result, the relationship between benefit levels
at different ages is closer to that present in the period before the elimination of the ET for those
above the NRA. This translates in the prediction that later claimers obtain higher benefits.
More importantly for the purposes of our study of benefits withholding we can see that the
model predicts a proportion of individuals facing benefits withholding of around 9.7% at age 62,
around 8% at age 63, and 5% at age 64. This is reported in the column labeled ARFs, which gives
the count of individuals with some checks withheld. These numbers although a bit higher than the
currently prevailing proportions, are not very different from the numbers observed just a few years
ago. From the last column of the table we can see that individuals who earn in a given year above
the ET limit earn well above that limit. These results are in sharp contrast from Model 1, which
predicts a much lower numbers of individuals earning above the limit between ages 62 and 64, and
even among those who have withholdings their earnings are much lower than in Model 2.
The overall performance of the benchmark model gives us confidence in using the model to
perform some policy experiments regarding the structure of the Earnings Test.
6.3 Policy Experiments
Table simulates behavioral responses to changes in the provisions of the Earnings Test in the Social
Security Retirement system. We solve and simulate three models: one in which the Earnings Test
limit is increased for those between 62 and 65 to the same level prevalent for those between 65 and
the NRA; a second one in which the taxation of earnings above the limit decreases from 50% to
33% for those between age 62 and 65; and finally we also analyze the consequences of removing
the Earnings Test altogether.
The first panel of Table shows the consequences of increases the Earnings Test limit for those
between age 62 and 65 to the same level as for those between age 65 and the NRA, which means
above $33,240. The policy has a clear effect on claiming behavior, with more individuals claiming
early, in fact around 56% would claim at age 62. The change also leads to a slight decrease in full-
time work between age 62 and 64, with a corresponding increase in part-time work. The number
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of individuals affected by the ET goes down considerably compared with the benchmark model,
but among those affected the earnings levels are much higher than before.
The second panel of this table shows the effects of changing the tax rate on benefits when
individuals earn above the limit between ages 62 and 65. When we change the rate from the
current 50% to 33%, the claiming behavior is only slightly affected compared with the benchmark
model, but in clear contrast to the results in panel one above. In this case the proportions of those
claiming at age 62 goes down slightly. Additionally, labor supply also has a very small response
to this change, with only minor changes in the distribution of individuals choosing to work full-
time, part-time, or not working. Notice as well, that the proportions of those facing adjustment
in benefits due to withholding goes down but not as much as under the previous experiment. The
drop in those affected is to be expected since now the tax rate is lower.
Finally, panel three in this table shows the experiment of removing the Earnings Test altogether.
The claiming behavior changes dramatically with respect to the benchmark model, and over 64%
of individuals claim at age 62, with smaller proportions claiming at the other ages. The largest
effect is in labor supply for those age 62 and 63. At both ages we see a drop in full-time work,
with a large increase in part-time work at age 63, which is still present at age 64. Interestingly,
among those who work, their realized wages result in more of them being above the now revoked
earnings test limit. All this evidence suggests the presence of two effects, one pushing towards
early claiming and early retirement resulting in the lower participation at age 62, and one pushing
towards more work resulting in the higher participation at all other ages. These results are in line
with our findings in Benı́tez-Silva and Heiland (2007), and the discussion therein.
The results from this policy analysis suggest that only a removal of the Earnings Test is likely
to have sizable consequences on labor supply and earnings of individuals, while tinkering with the
details of the ET provision will likely have small effects on behavior and outcomes.
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7 Conclusions
Since the removal of the Earnings Test in the year 2000 for those above the NRA, there has been
relatively little discussion of the Earnings Test for younger retirees, despite the fact that as the
NRA increases a larger proportion of Americans will be affected by it. In order to adopt any re-
form the research community and policy makers must understand how individuals respond to these
incentives that affect the interaction between work, retirement benefits, and retirement behavior.
This paper provides better documentation and understanding of individuals’ monthly benefit re-
ceipt and withholding, and we expect it will provide researchers and policy makers with a level of
detail that facilitates, among other things, more accurate predictions of life cycle benefit outlays
across demographics as the NRA increases. Also important for policy, our work identifies some of
the characteristics of those that are less likely to experience benefit withholding, for example they
are more likely to be females, be less educated, have access to private pensions, and have a health
limitation for work. These findings will help provide a quantitative measure of the possible in-
duced entry effect into the SSDI or SSI program if the Early Retirement Age were to be increased.
We believe the interaction between retirement and disability benefits is likely to be significantly
affected by the work incentives provided by the Earnings Test.
As the population ages, and the number of years between the Early and the Normal Retirement
Age increases over time, the administrative costs and the welfare burden currently associated with
the Earnings Test and the actuarial reduction mechanism will likely increase since these incentives
affect every American who reaches retirement age. As part of the ongoing debate on Social Se-
curity Reform, one possible set of changes that has been discussed includes increasing both the
NRA and the ERA in the coming years in order to avoid even more radical changes to the system.
Although raising the early retirement age appears to have little support today, it cannot be ruled
out that it will be considered more seriously as the system approaches insolvency. If the limited
documentation of the Earnings Test and its role in affecting the rate of future benefits remains, its
distortionary incentives are likely to continue to affect millions of Americans who consider work-
ing after claiming benefits early. As the NRA increases, the distortions will increasingly affect
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older retirees, and if the ERA also increases, the burden shifts from younger to older retirees.
Using a fairly realistic dynamic model of retirement, we find that neither fairly important
changes in some of the provisions of the Earnings Test, nor the elimination of the ET might have a
large enough effect on labor supply and earnings to meaningfully address the solvency problems of
the system, and could in fact lead to even earlier claiming in the case of an increase in the Earnings
Test limits or its elimination.13 Therefore, in the hope of improving the solvency of the system,
alternatives policies should be analyzed. The possibility of increasing the Early Retirement Age
would mechanically delay claiming benefits and likely increase labor supply in the years leading to
the new ERA, but would have a limited effect on the long run solvency of the system. Furthermore,
it is highly regressive given the socio-demographic composition of early claimers. An alternative
to those policies is to devise an actuarially unfair incentive structure in which late claiming is re-
warded via higher benefits. The latter would be implemented hoping that the actual labor supply
responses, and the resulting tax revenues, compensate for the cost of such a policy. While it is
regressive, it might be less so than just increasing the Early Retirement Age.
13See Benı́tez-Silva and Heiland (2007), Song and Manchester (2007), French (2005), Song (2004), Gustman and
Steinmeier (2004), Gruber and Orszag (2003), and Disney and Smith (2001) for a discussion of the labor supply effects
of the removal of the Earnings Test.
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Figure 1: Early Claiming and Benefit Withholding. Master Beneficiary Data.
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Table 1: Social Security Claiming Behavior, 1994-2006. Proportions by age of first receipt. Statistical Supplement.
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997a 1998a 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Age 62 0.589 0.582 0.60 0.597 0.583 0.586 0.517 0.554 0.56 0.569 0.575 0.566 0.538
Age 63 0.079 0.079 0.075 0.073 0.080 0.079 0.067 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.081 0.083 0.085
Age 64 0.121 0.116 0.108 0.105 0.107 0.107 0.104 0.134 0.148 0.127 0.109 0.099 0.104
Age 65 0.156 0.163 0.157 0.155 0.156 0.156 0.196 0.178 0.172 0.178 0.186 0.197 0.223
Age 66 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.039 0.013 0.009 0.010 0.012 0.014 0.011
Age 67-69 0.023 0.024 0.026 0.034 0.029 0.091 0.055 0.019 0.015 0.016 0.018 0.018 0.017
Age 70+ 0.019 0.017 0.014 0.015 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.016 0.019 0.018 0.020 0.022
# of Claimantsb 1,444 1,424 1,396 1,418 1,441 1,484 1,758 1,574 1,595 1,593 1,680 1,793 1,771
Notes: a The percentages do not coincide with those reported in the Statistical Supplements since we have not counted the 120,000
widows who were converted in these years from widow benefits to retirement benefits. b In thousands of claimers. Does not include
disability conversions at the NRA.
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Table 2: Social Security Beneficiaries’ Monthly Benefits by Age, 1994-2006. In Dollars of 2005. Statistical Supplement.
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Age 62 789 789 785 802 815 856 865 884 893 900 888 882 878
Age 63 882 906 943 882 908 929 961 974 1,003 1,006 997 987 1,009
Age 64 982 983 997 1,015 1,002 988 1,020 1,073 1,120 1,120 1,102 1,089 1,088
Age 65 1,084 1,091 1,088 1,117 1,088 1,100 1,184 1,176 1,239 1,257 1,271 1,298 1,335
Age 66 1,022 1,077 1,033 1,049 1,030 1,094 1,248 940 882 920 981 1,052 1,087
Age 67 1,028 1,138 1,071 989 1,050 1,129 1,286 911 873 878 934 1,010 1,012
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Table 3: Social Security Claiming, 1994-2004. Proportions by Age of First Receipt. Public-Use Microdata.
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997a 1998a 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Age 62 0.523 0.512 0.511 0.518 0.518 0.503 0.452 0.49 0.483 0.487 0.496
Age 63 0.161 0.166 0.143 0.151 0.152 0.147 0.136 0.157 0.156 0.145 0.143
Age 64 0.074 0.069 0.064 0.063 0.068 0.067 0.06 0.069 0.07 0.069 0.067
Age 65 0.184 0.196 0.176 0.186 0.186 0.196 0.228 0.241 0.247 0.254 0.201
Age 66 0.018 0.02 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.027 0.043 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.071
Age 67-69 0.024 0.023 0.032 0.029 0.03 0.036 0.057 0.016 0.014 0.015 0.01
Age 70+ 0.016 0.014 0.05 0.032 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.012
# of Claimants 10,700 11,026 11,676 11,619 12,055 13,048 14,976 13,606 13,708 14,098 14,852
Notes: a This data is retired workers only. In the data, there is no way to separate disability converters from OA claimants at age 65.
What we have done is to assume a proportion of SS claimants from age-65 samples each year as disability converters. The proportions
used are calculated according to the Annual Statistical Supplemental.
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Table 4: Social Security Beneficiaries’ Monthly Benefits by Age, 1994-2004. In Dollars of 2005. Public-Use Microdata.
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Age 62 853 831 834 840 849 890 879 891 909 906 860
Age 63 903 928 906 905 918 917 958 945 948 964 913
Age 64 1,016 1,015 1,021 989 985 1,016 1,027 1,085 1,094 1,080 1,064
Age 65 1,138 1,129 1,128 1,134 1,103 1,103 1,123 1,151 1,194 1,197 1,146
Age 66 1,238 1,129 1,188 1,145 1,204 1,225 1,292 945 914 1,041 1,196
Age 67 1,157 1,170 1,213 1,164 1,131 1,264 1,385 925 984 945 1,026
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Table 5: Meansa of Variables in Benefit Withholding Criteria Analysis
Sample
Variable Name Definition Earnings ALimit Earnings ALimit Earnings ALimit Benefit Decline
At Age 62 At Age 63 At Age 64 Before NRA
Male 1 if male, 0 otherwise (ow) 0.52 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50)
White 1 if white, 0 ow 0.80 (0.40) 0.79 (0.41) 0.79 (0.41) 0.80 (0.40)
No Diploma 1 if no high school diploma, 0 ow 0.63 (0.48) 0.63 (0.48) 0.64 (0.48) 0.63 (0.48)
Vocational Training 1 if vocational training received, 0 ow 0.28 (0.45) 0.27 (0.44) 0.28 (0.45) 0.28 (0.45)
Bachelors Degree 1 if Bachelor degree obtained, 0 ow 0.20 (0.40) 0.19 (0.39) 0.20 (0.40) 0.19 (0.39)
Professional Degree 1 if professional degree obtained, 0 ow 0.06 (0.23) 0.05 (0.23) 0.06 (0.24) 0.05 (0.23)
Married 1 if currently married/living together, 0 ow 0.78 (0.41) 0.80 (0.40) 0.79 (0.41) 0.82 (0.39)
Primary Respondent 1 if respondent is financially 0.68 (0.47) 0.65 (0.48) 0.68 (0.47) 0.71 (0.45)
knowledgeable person, 0 ow
Cognitive Ability cognitive ability test score (scale: 0-14) 6.03 (2.77) 6.09 (2.82) 6.15 (2.84) 6.38 (2.80)
Prob. Living to 85 self-reported probability of living to age 85 0.46 (0.30) 0.47 (0.30) 0.46 (0.30) 0.46 (0.30)
Health Limitation Work 1 if health limitations for work exist, 0 ow 0.18 (0.38) 0.18 (0.39) 0.17 (0.38) 0.19 (0.39)
No Insurance 1 if no health insurance, 0 ow 0.10 (0.30) 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.29) 0.10 (0.31)
Private Insurance 1 if has private health insurance, 0 ow 0.20 (0.40) 0.21 (0.41) 0.20 (0.40) 0.25 (0.43)
Net Wealth total net household wealth (in $100,000s) 2.39 (2.98) 2.64 (4.80) 2.68 (5.03) 2.90 (5.28)
Private Pension 1 if has private pension, 0 ow 0.57 (0.50) 0.57 (0.50) 0.57 (0.50) 0.54 (0.50)
PIA monthly benefits if claimed at NRA, from 0.83 (0.42) 0.77 (0.45) 0.83 (0.41) 0.80 (0.44)
master beneficiary data (in 1,000s $1991)
Earnings A Limit, 62 1 if earnings exceed ET limit when 62, 0 ow 0.07 (0.26)
Earnings A Limit, 63 1 if earnings exceed ET limit when 63, 0 ow 0.13 (0.34)
Earnings A Limit, 64 1 if earnings exceed ET limit when 64, 0 ow 0.11 (0.31)
Benefit Decline 1 if benefits decline before NRA, 0 ow 0.10 (0.30)
Benefit Increase 1 if benefits increase after NRA, 0 ow
Others regional dummies; dummies for missing obs.
N sample size (max) 941 1482 1465 551
Notes: aBased on valid records when respondent turned 62. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
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Table 6: Characteristics Associated with Benefit Withholding Criteria. Health and Retire-
ment Survey.
Probit Estimates (Marginal Effects)
Variable Name Earnings B Limit Earnings B Limit Earnings B Limit Benefit Decline
At Age 62 At Age 63 At Age 64 Before NRA
Male 0.030 C 0.053 CDCEC 0.020 0.024
(0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
White -0.006 0.014 -0.016 -0.003
(0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.026)
Bachelors Degree 0.029 0.008 0.061 CDC -0.031
(0.022) (0.024) (0.028) (0.020)
Professional Degree -0.010 0.001 -0.013 0.137 CDC
(0.024) (0.039) (0.030) (0.095)
Married -0.007 -0.002 -0.023 -0.037
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.030)
Primary Respondent 0.021 0.059 CDCEC 0.017 0.008
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
Cognitive Ability Score 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 0.006 C
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Prob. Living to 85 0.017 0.043 -0.030 -0.016
(0.033) (0.038) (0.038) (0.043)
Health Limitation Work -0.036 CDC -0.051 CDC -0.036 C 0.024
(0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.027)
No Insurance 0.053 C -0.005 -0.013 -0.042 C
(0.038) (0.028) (0.027) (0.018)
Private Insurance 0.030 0.035 -0.003 0.035
(0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.025)
Net Wealth 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PIA 65 0.045 C 0.055 CDC 0.076 CDCEC -0.111 CECDC
(0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.030)
Private Pension -0.031 C -0.022 -0.072 CDCDC 0.028
(0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020)
N 941 1482 1465 551
R2 (pseudo) 0.124 0.100 0.069 0.110
Notes: See text for a detailed explanation of the dependent variables. All models also include controls for region, miss-
ing observations on marital status, probability of living to 85, health insurance, and net wealth. Robust standard errors
are presented in parentheses. Data are based on waves 1 through 5 of the Health and Retirement Survey. C Statistically
significant at the .10 level; CDC at the .05 level; CDCEC at the .01 level.
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Table 7: Simulation Results: 10,000 Simulations of the Dynamic Model
Ages Full-Timea Part-Timea No Worka Claimersb Benefits in $ ARFSc Wages F ETd Wages in $e
Model 1: Earnings Test as a Tax
Age 60 5,762 (69.9%) 125 (2.5%) 2,348 (28.5%) — — — — —
Age 61 5,635 (69.7%) 168 (2.1%) 2,276 (28.2%) — — — — —
Age 62 5,494(69.1%) 0 (0%) 2,458 (30.9%) 1,945 (25.62%) 1,061 — 0 —
Age 63 3,281 (42.2%) 221 (2.8%) 4,266 (54.9%) 839 (11.1%) 1,155 — 63 16,797
Age 64 1,052 (13.8%) 903 (11.9%) 5,632 (74.2%) 1,077 (14.2%) 1,288 — 286 15,557
Age 65 885 (11.9%) 0 (0%) 6,536 (88.1%) 2,478 (32.6%) 1,366 — 461 43,899
Age 66 1,295 (17.9%) 500 (6.9%) 5,945 (82.1%) 938 (12.3%) 1,481 — 710 44,172
Age 67 963 (13.67%) 0 (0%) 6,082 (86.3%) 303 (3.9%) 1,628 — 538 44,617
Model 2: Earnings Test with ARF Adjustments
Age 60 5,764 (69.9%) 127 (1.5%) 2,344 (28.5%) — — — — —
Age 61 5,636 (69.7%) 167 (2.1%) 2,276 (28.2%) — — — — —
Age 62 4,097 (51.5%) 0 (0%) 3,855 (48.5%) 3,722 (48%) 1,013 361 (9.69%) 446 34,717
Age 63 1,665 (21.4%) 1,357 (17.5%) 4,746 (61.1%) 1,060 (13.7%) 1,156 374 (7.98%) 798 28,363
Age 64 437 (5.8%) 2,353 (31%) 4,797 (63.2%) 800 (10.3%) 1,277 267 (4.9%) 1,046 22,668
Age 65 176 (2.4%) 3,087 (41.6%) 4,158 (56%) 1,833 (23.7%) 1,391 9 (0.16%) 124 44,261
Age 66 550 (7.6%) 4,167 (57.5%) 2,523 (34.8%) 332 (4.3%) 1,480 9 (0.12%) 357 44,513
Age 67 331 (4.7%) 4,419 (62.7%) 2,295 (32.6%) 0 (0%) — 9 (0.13%) 217 45,851
Notes: aIn numbers, and as percentage of survivors. Survivors for ages 60 to 67 are: 8,235; 8,079; 7,952; 7,768;
7,587; 7,421; 7,240; 7,045. bNumber of First Claimers at that age, and as percentage of the total who ever claimed.
cIndividuals with Benefits Withheld: In numbers, and as percentage of all claimers at that age. dIndividuals who earn
above the Earnings Test limits. In the third panel these calculations are just illustrative. eWages for those who earn
above the ET limit.
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Table 8: Policy Experiment: Reform of the Earnings Test. 10,000 Simulations of the Dynamic
Model
Ages Full-Timea Part-Timea No Worka Claimersb Benefits in $ ARFSc Wages F ETd Wages in $
Model 1: Increase in Earnings Test Limit
Age 60 5,766 (70%) 126 (1.5%) 2,343 (28.5%) — — — — —
Age 61 5,635 (69.7%) 174 (2.1%) 2,278 (28.2%) — — — — —
Age 62 3,764 (47.3%) 0 (0%) 4,188 (52.6%) 4,350 (56%) 1,054 72 (1.6%) 322 42,016
Age 63 1,557 (20%) 1,898 (24.4%) 4,313 (55.5%) 714 (9.2%) 1,192 100(2%) 308 45,480
Age 64 496 (6.5%) 2,523 (32.2%) 4,568 (60.2%) 676 (8.7%) 1,285 72(1.3%) 258 45,216
Age 65 214 (2.9%) 3,169 (42.7%) 4,038 (54.4%) 1,711 (22%) 1,393 17 (0.02%) 152 44,628
Age 66 591 (8.2%) 4,143 (57.2%) 2,506 (34.6%) 318 (4.1%) 1,480 17 (0.02%) 383 44,708
Age 67 365 (5.1%) 4,393 (62.3%) 2,287 (32.5%) 0 (0%) — 17 (0.02%) — —
Model 2: Decrease in Benefit Tax Rate
Age 60 5,763 (69.9%) 127 (1.5%) 2,345 (28.5%) — — — — —
Age 61 5,636 (69.7%) 167 (2.1%) 2,276 (28.2%) — — — — —
Age 62 4,089 (51.4%) 0 (0%) 3,863 (48.6%) 3,552 (45.9%) 1,035 136 (3.8%) 267 34,153
Age 63 1,610 (20.7%) 1,388 (17.8%) 4,770 (61.4%) 1,100 (14.2%) 1,162 156 (3.4%) 617 25,621
Age 64 361 (4.8%) 2,342 (30.9%) 4,884 (64.4%) 856 (11.1%) 1,286 136 (2.6%) 939 21,233
Age 65 197 (2.6%) 3,010 (40.6%) 4,214 (56.8%) 1,887 (24.4%) 1,393 17 (0.24%) 146 45,291
Age 66 537 (7.4%) 4,169 (57.6%) 2,534 (35%) 343 (4.4%) 1,483 17(0.23%) 349 44,591
Age 67 345 (4.9%) 4,407 (62.5%) 2,293 (32.5%) 0 (0%) — 17 (0.24%) — —
Model 3: Removal of the Earnings Test
Age 60 5,766 (70%) 126 (1.6%) 2,343 (28.4%) — — — — —
Age 61 5,635 (69.8%) 166 (2%) 2,278 (28.2%) — — — — —
Age 62 3,341 (42%) 0 (0%) 4,611 (58%) 4,999 (64%) 1,087 — 941 33,439
Age 63 1,470 (18.9%) 2,210 (28.4%) 4,088 (52.6%) 611 (7.8%) 1,197 — 1,411 27,842
Age 64 641 (8.4%) 2,775 (36.6%) 4,171 (54.9%) 608 (7.8%) 1,287 — 1,497 25,251
Age 65 413 (5.6%) 3,370 (45.4%) 3,638 (49%) 1,358 (17.4%) 1,383 — 271 45,218
Age 66 641 (8.8%) 4,165 (57.5%) 2,434 (33.6%) 230 (2.9%) 1,477 — 413 44,418
Age 67 416 (5.9%) 4,347 (61.7%) 2,282 (32.4%) 0 (0%) — — — —
Notes: aIn numbers, and as percentage of survivors. The number of survivors for ages 60 to 67 are the same as in the
previous table. bNumber of First Claimers at that age, and as percentage of the total who ever claimed. cIndividuals
with Benefits Withheld: In numbers, and as percentage of all claimers at that age. dIndividuals who earn above the
Earnings Test limits. In the third panel these calculations are just illustrative.
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